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Solving The Proposition 13 Puzzle: From
Amador To Nordlinger -- Judicial
Challenges And Alternatives
The "American Dream" of purchasing one's first home has
turned sour in California. After living in rental properties for 25
years, imagine the excitement of purchasing a first home in 1988
in the Baldwin Hills area of Los Angeles for $170,000. This starter
home is a three bedroom modest affair, which is part of a tract of
single family homes developed in 1947. The initial excitement,
however, begins to fade when the total annual property tax bill is
$1700. The excitement rapidly dissipates when one discovers that
the next door neighbor in this tract development only pays $350 in
annual property tax for a home which is slightly larger. The
excitement completely disintegrates when one discovers that the
property tax bill for the newly purchased Baldwin Hills home is
roughly the same as a palatial Malibu beachfront home worth over
$2,100,000!
This exemplifies the disparity in California's property taxation
system caused by Proposition 13. Owners of similarly sized
homes which sit directly next to one another pay drastically
different property tax bills.2 Additionally, those who can afford to
pay the most, California's long-time homeowners, continue to pay
very low property tax bills. Proposition 13 promised to solve the
problem of rapidly increasing property taxes, by limiting those
1. The Initiative Constitutional Amendment - Property Tax Limitation, Prop. 13, §§ 1-6
(codified at CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6). See CAL. CONsT. art XIIIA, §§ 311-6 (authorizing
property taxation in California); Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 1267, 275 Cal Rptr.
684, 670 (1990) (providing examples of the inequities caused by Proposition 13), petition for cert.
denied, No. S019216, 1992 Cal. Sup. CL LEXIS 842, at *1 (Feb. 28, 1991); aff'd sub nom.,
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992); SENATE COMMISSION ON PROPERTY TAX EQUITY AND
REVENUE REPORT TO THE CAuFORNIA STATE SENATE, at 33 (June 1991) (prepared pursuant to
Senate Resolutions 42 and 8) [hereinafter 'COMMIssION'] (discussing the inherent inequities caused
by Proposition 13).
2. CoMMissioN, supra note 1, at 33.
3. Id.
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taxes through the enactment of a "welcome stranger" system of
taxation.4 Despite a number of judicial challenges from those who
perceived this system as unfair, Proposition 13 has survived. 5 The
first challenge to Proposition 13 came to the California Supreme
Court in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State
Board of Equalization where the constitutionality of Proposition 13
was upheld.6 Based on the decision in Amador, the California
courts of appeal have consistently refused to accept any argument
for overturning the validity of Proposition 13.' Recently, the
United States Supreme Court upheld Proposition 13 under what
appears to be the stiffest constitutional attack, the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.8 Therefore, Proposition
13 is not likely to be overturned by a judicial decision.9
Nevertheless, the inequities created by Proposition 13 continue to
4. See Robert Lindsey, Budget Cuts Begin After California Votes to Curb Taxes, N.Y. Ties,
June 8, 1978, at Al, A25 (discussing the passage of Proposition 13); Robert Glennon, Taxation and
Equal Protection, 58 Gao. WAs-. L. REv. 261,264 (1990) (discussing "welcome stranger" systems
of property taxation). Since newer purchasers, referred to as "strangers," bear a higher tax burden
they would be "welcomed" by existing homeowners. Glennon, supra, at 264. Thus, recently appraised
property has a higher assessed value and existing homes assessed values remain the same, except for
an annual increase of two percent. Id.
5. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (1992) (upholding the
constitutionality of Proposition 13 under an attack based on the United States Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 257 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality
of Proposition 13 based on a number of separate grounds including the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d 352, 370, 276
Cal. Rptr. 530,541 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of Proposition 13 under a challenge based
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), petition for cert. denied, No.
S019216, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 943, at *1 (Feb. 28, 1991); Northwest Fin., Inc. v. Board of Equalization,
229 Cal. App. 3d 198, 205, 280 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1991) (upholding the constitutionality of
Proposition 13 based on a challenge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment), petitionfor cert. denied, No. S021146, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 3204 (July 11, 1991),petition
for cert. denied, 112 S. CL 3026 (1992); see infra notes 117-263 and accompanying text (discussing
the judicial challenges to Proposition 13).
6. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 248, 583 P.2d at 1299, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257; see infra notes 117-
154 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings in the Amador decision).
7. See infra 155-216 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of two California courts
of appeal to arguments to overturn the constitutionality of Proposition 13).
8. Nordlinger, 112 S. CL at 2335.
9. See COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing challenges and the possibilities of
overturning Proposition 13).
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increase and California must look for alternatives to the existing
system.1
This Comment will review the important aspects of California's
property taxation system, the significant judicial challenges to the
system, and suggest alternatives that must be considered. Part I of
this Comment explores the historical background of Proposition 13
and events which have occurred since its passage including a
number of judicial decisions."1 Part II examines the most recent
judicial challenges to Proposition 13 in Nordlinger v. Hahn.'2 Part
Ill focuses on the legal ramifications of the Nordlinger decision
and its implications as well as possible alternatives to Proposition
13 which California must consider in the years to come.13
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Prior to 1978, California property was assessed at its market
value as determined by sales transactions of comparable
property. 4 Inflation in the 1970's drove California property values
at an annual rate nearly three times the national average, or nearly
120%. '5 Single-family residential property assessments increased
by 110% between 1974 and 1978.16 The combined property tax
rate, on average, prior to 1978 was 2.67% of the assessed value.
17
10. See LENNY GOLDBERG, TAXATION WrrH REPRESENTATION: A CmzEN's GUr E To
PROPOSITION 13, at 3 (1991) (suggesting that a significant revision of Proposition 13 is necessary);
see also infra notes 297-349 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to Proposition 13).
11. See infra notes 14-213 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 214-262 and accompanying tzxt.
13. See infra notes 263-345 and accompanying text.
14. CoMIssION, supra note 1, at 24.
15. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 4. See William H. Oakland, Proposiion 13-Genesis and
Consequence, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979) (discussing the rapid valuation increases
in California). California's per capita property tax collection in fiscal year 1975-76 was $965. Id. This
placed California third behind Alaska ($1,896) and New York ($1,135). Id. California's property
taxation level was 32% above the nation average. Id. In the 1975-76, fiscal year Californians ranked
third in percentage of personal income paid for property taxes. Id. At 14.9%, California ranked 19%
above the national average, which placed it third behind New York and Vermont. Id. See also George
Lefcoe & Barney Allison, The LegalAspects of Proposition 13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. CAL.
L. REv. 173, 176 (1979) (discussing California's tax burden relative to other states prior to the
passage of Proposition 13).
16. CoMMISSION, supra note 1, at 4.
17. Id. at 5.
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By 1978, this inflation meant that California's taxpayers were
paying approximately 16% of their income on local property
taxes. 1
8
Several attempts through the initiative process failed to cure the
problems of rapidly rising property taxation. 9 Each of the ballot
measures proposed an overall limit on property taxation.2" The
failure of these measures indicates that property taxes did not come
to the forefront of voters minds until inflation had affected property
tax bills.2' By 1978, the state amassed a monumental budget
surplus while taxpayers continued to pay more and more property
22taxes. As a result, property taxes, and taxation in general,
became a major political issue.23
A group of tax activists, led by Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann,
obtained enough signatures to place Proposition 13, the first
comprehensive property tax initiative in California, on the June
1978 ballot.24 Proposition 13 was passed with 64.8% of the
18. Id at 3.
19. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY REVENUIE & TAXATioN CoMMmEE, FACTS ABOUT
PROPOSITION 13, THE JARVIS / GANN INMrrTIVE 7 (1978) [hereinafter "FACTs ABoUT PRoposmoN
13"] (discussing the failed attempts at property taxation reform prior to Proposition 13). Proposition
9 proposed a I% limit on property taxation in 1968, but was defeated. Id. Proposition 14, in 1972,
proposed a limit of the property tax rate of 1.75% from 2%, but was also defeated. Id.; see also Julie
K. Koyama, Financing Local Government in the Post-Proposition 13 Era: The Use and Effectiveness
ofNon Taxing Revenue Sources, 22 PAC. L. 1333, 1336 n.20 (1991) (discussing the failed attempts
to reform property taxation).
20. FAcrs ABOUT PRoPosmoN 13, supra note 19, at 7.
21. Id.
22. See COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing the fact that the State surplus in fiscal
1977-78 was caused by the lack of action by California's leaders at the time); GOLDBERO, supra note
10, at 4 (providing a discussion of California's surplus in 1977-78). The market value property tax
system had been established during Ronald Reagan's term as Governor with bi-partisan support. Id.
Governor Jerry Brown's administration while never increasing property taxes, failed to return the
huge surplus to the taxpayers. Id.; see also Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 15, at 176 (discussing the
State's surplus as an impetus for Proposition 13).
23. See Lindsey, supra note 4, at A25 (discussing the enormous battle over Proposition 13 and
stating that Proposition 13 was the beginning of a national tax revolt); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn,
112 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1992) (indicating that property taxes had become a monumental political issue
prior to the passage of Proposition 13).
24. See Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 15, at 174. The popularity of the initiative was apparent
long before the election. Id. The initiative received 1.2 million signatures rather than the required
500,000. Id. The importance of the initiative is exemplified by the fact that the signatures were
achieved through the efforts of a group of volunteers working on a budget of $28,000. Id.
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vote,2* thereby enacting article XfIIA of the California
Constitution.26 Article XIIIA establishes an ad valorem system27
of property taxation, more commonly, known as a "welcome
28stranger" system.
A. Elements of Article XIIIA
Article XIJA of the California Constitution as enacted in 1978
consisted of four important elements.29 First, total annual property
tax is limited to one percent of the full cash value of the
property.30 Second, "full cash value" is defined as the county
assessor's valuation in the 1975-76 tax roll for property purchased
or constructed before 1975.31 For property purchased or
25. See CAL. SECRErARY OF STATE, STATEMENT Op VoTE 39 (1978) (noting the success of
the popular vote of Proposition 13). Proposition 13 received 4,280,689 "yes" votes in comparison
with 2,326,167 "no" votes (35.2%). Id.
26. See CAL. CONsT. art. XIlA, §§ 1-6 (providing for property taxation in California). See
generally David R Doerr, The California's Legislature's Response to Proposition 13,53 S. CAL. L.
REv. 77 (1979) (discussing the implementation of Proposition 13).
27. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1991) (defining ad valorem property tax as
a tax imposed on the value of property).
28. See supra note 4 (defining a "welcome stranger" system of property taxation). See
generally PAUL RicHTER, CAUFORNIA AND THE AMmucAN TAX REvOLT: PRoPOSITION 13 FIvE
YEARS LATER 1-70 (Terry Schwadron ed., 1984) (discussing the historical background for the
enactment of Proposition 13); DAvID 0. SEARs & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT. SOMETHING FOR
NoTmING IN CALIFORNIA 1-206 (1982) (discussing the historical backgrounds for the voter revolt for
change in California's property taxation system).
29. See CAi. CONST. art XIIIA, §§ 1-4 (providing for the four key elements to Proposition
13); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1992) (discussing the elements of article
XIIIA generally); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208,220,583 P.2d 1281, 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239,242 (1978) (discussing the elements of article
XIA); Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 15, at 180-81 (discussing the elements of article XIIIA; Jay
Rappaport; The Constitutionality of Proposition 13 Under the Equal Protection Clause; 26 REAL
PROP., PROB., & TR. J. 235, 239-43 (1991) (detailing the elements of article XIA).
30. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(a). This limitation of 1% does not include any bonded
indebtedness approved by the voters. Md § I(b). Article XIHA requires that any bonded indebtedness
after July 1, 1978 must be approved by a two-thirds vote. IL See generally Arvin Union Sch. Dist.
v. Ross, 221 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727, 176 Cal. App. 3d 189, 201 (1985) (construing the term bonded
indebtedness to mean an actual debt of an amount certain for money already received, repaid in
periodic payments in installments upon principal and interest with intent and purpose of redeeming
the original debt).
31. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a); see Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2346 (holding that the
acquisition method of property taxation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); see infra notes 214-262 (discussing the decision in Nordlinger). Note that
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constructed after 1975, the assessed value is the value of the
property at the time of the purchase or construction.32 Third, any
changes in state property taxes enacted for the purpose of
increasing revenues may only be enacted by a two-thirds vote of
each house of the California State Legislature and the state
legislature is prohibited from enacting any new ad valorem
property taxes or taxes on transactions of real property." Fourth,
local "special" tax increases must be approved by a two-thirds
popular vote of the respective city, county, or special district, and
these local governments are prohibited from imposing any new ad
valorem taxes on real property or transactions of real property.34
There are two key exemptions to this basic system." Persons
over the age of fifty-five who sell their principal residence and
purchase a dwelling of equal or lesser value are permitted to
transfer their base value to their new residence. 6 The base value
is the level of assessment on their previous home.37 Under this
exemption, the level of assessment of the previous residence stays
with persons over age fifty-five rather than the increased level of
assessment they would have faced in purchasing a new home. 8
Additionally, transfers of principal residences between parents and
children are exempt from reassessment.39 The system of property
property which does not change ownership during a fiscal year is increased at an inflationary rate not
to exceed 2%. CAL. CoNsT. art. XIIIA § 2(b).
32. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a).
33. lId, § 3. An important portion of this subsection mandates that no new ad valorem taxes
on real property, sales taxes, or transaction taxes on the sale of real property may be imposed. Id.;
see Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245,251,806 P.2d 1360,1366,
279 Cal. Rptr. 325, 332 (1991) (indicating that the restrictions in this section of the California
Constitution did not limit the power of initiative reserved elsewhere in the constitution).
34. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4. Note that Proposition 13 does not define "special" taxes.
Rappaport, supra note 29, at 242 n.30; see Huntington Park Dev. Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100,
111, 695 P.2d 2202 232, 211 Cal. Rptr. 133, 139 (1985) (stating that the purpose of article XIIIA is
to prevent the government from recouping its losses from decreased property taxes, arising out of the
Proposition 13 initiative).
35. See CAL CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a)-(h) (providing exemptions to article XIIIA).
36. kd § 2(a).
37. Id.; see Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2332 (discussing the exemptions to Proposition 13).
38. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a).
39. Id § 2(h). In the November 1992 election California enacted an amendment to article
XIIIA to allow the Legislature to extend the homeowners exemption to include survivors of veterans
injured or kitled in military service. State Developments, DAILY REP. FOR EXEcs., Nov. 6, 1992, at
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taxation created by Proposition 13 has caused a number of
consequences for California's local governments.
B. Effects of Proposition 13
Since Proposition 1340 rolled back property tax rates to their
1975-76 levels, the immediate effect was to provide a $7 billion tax
revenue reduction.41 The $7 billion cut came out of local property
tax revenue.42 The state attempted to replace the $7 'billion in lost
revenue by a one time allocation of $4.4 billion from the existing
surplus to local governments.43 Nevertheless, the drain on local
governments has continued to be felt over the years because the
loss of revenue has never been corrected.
The long-term effects of Proposition 13 are now being realized
by California's local governments. The total cumulative tax cut
from the passage of Proposition 13 from 1977-78 to 1988-89 is
estimated to be $120 billion.44 While this may have individually
216. Thus, Proposition 160 represents further refinement of Proposition 13. Id. Proposition 160
passed with a 51.5% "yes" vote compared to a 48.5% "no" vote. Id. A Legislative Analyst Office
analysis said that there is no direct fiscal impact on the state because Proposition 160 merely permits
the Legislature to create an additional exemption. Id. However, if the Legislature creates the
exemption, local property taxes could be greatly reduced. Id. Under existing law, veterans who are
disabled during the course of military service receive a tax exemption on their home which ends
when the veteran dies. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4(a). Proposition 160's purpose is to provide a
surviving widow or widower of a person who was killed or who died of a service related injury or
disease the same property tax exemption as one whose spouse had become disabled. CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PA'Hm , 28-31, Nov. 3, 1992 (compiled by Secretary of State) (comments by State
Assemblyman, James L. Brulte, Gary D. Villalba, President California Association of County
Veterans Service Officers, Inc., and Arthur F. Krause, Colonel USAF (ret.), Legislative Advocate,
California Association of County Veterans Service Officers).
40. Hereinafter, this Comment will refer to California's system of property taxation as
"Proposition 13," except where specific reference to article XI]IA is required. References in this
Comment are to the current amended text unless otherwise indicated.
41. Allen D. Manvel, Tracing Proposition 13 Effects, TAX NOTES, Dec. 21, 1981, at 1540-
41.
42. See COMMISsION, supra note 1, at 28-30 (stating that this revenue loss was attributed to
57% less in property tax revenue and 22% less in local revenue from all sources).
43. See GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that local governments also spent reserves,
increased fees and cut budgets to make up for lost revenues).
44. Id. at 15. This began at a tax cut of $7 billion per year and now equates to nearly $20
billion per year. Id. In 1989 the State collected $66 billion in state and local taxes. Id. The State's
transportation system has a 10-year budget of $18.5 billion. Id. Thus, one year's tax cut from
Proposition 13 is now roughly equivalent to 10 years of transportation funding. Id.
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benefited those who have remained in their homes over the years,
it has been a devastating financial drain on local governments,
including counties, cities and school districts."5
County governments have experienced significant financial
pressures since 1978.46 County property tax revenue in 1977-78
was approximately $3 billion.4 7 In 1988-89 this figure had grown
to $4.7 billion, but, after adjusting for inflation this figure was
actually only $2.2 billion.48 Thus, while needs for county services,
such as health and social services, jails, and courts, have increased,
available revenue has decreased.49 The declaration of bankruptcy
in 1989 by Butte County is just one example of the tremendous
burden on county governments.50
At the city government level, per capita revenue from 1978 to
1988 dropped 17.5%."' Some cities have been hit harder than
others, however. 2 Since Proposition 13's assessment system does
not allow for significant appreciation until property is sold, built-
out cities, such as Oakland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Long
Beach, have had numerous budgetary problems. 3 While these
built-out cities have had enormous property valuation increases,
there has been limited property tax revenue increases because
property owners continue to hold onto their residences.5 4 Cities in
rapid growth areas, such as Sacramento, San Jose, and San Diego,
have begun to feel the budgetary pinch even though they benefit
45. See id. (indicating the struggle to provide services to local government communities since
the passage of Proposition 13).
46. See COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 41 (discussing the effect of Proposition 13 on county
government); GOLDBER, supra note 10, at 24-27 (suggesting the effects of Proposition 13 on county
government).
47. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 26.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 19. This equates to $609 per capita in 1978 and $503 per capita in 1988. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 15-18 (discussing the long-term effects of Proposition 13 on built-out cities);
COMMIssION, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing the long term problems of cities after the passage of
Proposition 13).
54. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 26.
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financially from new housing starts.55 Primary and secondary
education is also an area of local government greatly affected by
the passage of Proposition 13.
Primary and secondary education has felt the greatest
immediate impact of Proposition 13.56 Between the fiscal years of
1977 and 1980, primary and secondary education saw a decrease
in expenditures of 17.2%, which totaled $2.1 billion.57
Californians have inevitably been forced to rely on local efforts to
supplement funding for public education.5" These local efforts
include: Local fundraising;59 sale or lease of school property; 6°
developer fees; 6t and special taxes.62 Not only have these local
efforts failed to successfully overcome the lack of revenue, there
remain serious questions as to the constitutionality of such revenue
55. See id., at 15-18 (commenting that rapid growth areas have begun to feel the budgetary
problems which plague built out cities); CoMIissIoN, supra note 1, at 43 (indicating additionally that
a lack of federal aid has contributed to the revenue decline of both built out and rapid growth cities).
56. See Joseph T. Henke, Financing Public Schools in California: The Aftermath of Serrano
v. Priest and Proposition 13, 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1986) (providing a discussion of the effects
of Proposition 13 on California's primary and secondary educational system). By 1983, California
had dropped from eighteenth in 1972-73 to forty-fifth in the proportion of personal income spent of
public education in the United States. Id.; see also JoiNT LEGIsLATrvE BuDrEr COMMrrrEE,
PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER, Sept. 30, 1987, at 6, 80-93, 121 (discussing the impact on
California public schools).
57. Manvel, supra note 41, at 1542.
58. See Henke, supra note 56, at 24-31 (discussing the alternative financing sources for local
governments). But see CAL CONST. art. XIIIB (establishing a revenue limit for local governments);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 619, 487 P.2d 1241, 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,626 (1971) (mandating
the equalization of school funding throughout California).
59. See Henke, supra note 56, at 24 (discussing the use of local fundraising efforts to
supplement lost revenues). By 1983, more than 100 tax-exempt, private charitable non-profit
foundations had been established to raise funds for school districts. I&.
60. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 39360-39384 (West 1978 & Supp. 1993); see Henke, supra note
56, at 25-26 (discussing the sales or lease of school property as a viable alternative funding source).
61. See Henke, supra note 56, at 29-30 (discussing the implementation of developer fees as
an additional funding source). See generally Candid Enter., Inc. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist.,
39 Cal. 3d 878, 890, 705 P.2d 876, 885, 218 Cal. Rptr. 303, 312 (1085) (upholding the
constitutionality of impact fees upon developers).
62. See CAL. CoNsT. art. XIIIA, § 4 (authorizing local governments to levy special taxes
through a vote of two-thirds of their constituents); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50075 (West 1983) (expressly
authorizing school districts to adopt special taxes); id. §§ 53311-53317 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993)
(specifying, through the Mello-Roos Act of 1982, that special districts may be established for the
purpose of levying special taxes for infrastructure and services).
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sources if wealthier districts begin to provide greater educational
services than poorer districts.63
In reaction to the constant reduction of funding for public
education, California passed another important initiative,
Proposition 98.6' Proposition 98, passed in 1988, guarantees 40%
of the California budget to be expended on public schools.65
Additionally, Proposition 98 guarantees distribution of any excess
state revenues to public education.' Proposition 98's formula is
tied to the California economy, which has recently caused cuts in
the amount the state is required to expend on public education.67
Thus, Proposition 98 will not ensure that public education receives
the amount of revenues it requires to educate adequately
California's children.68 Although Proposition 13 caused major
local governmental problems, some believed that Proposition 13
needed to be bolstered by closing the loopholes within the system.
C. Attempted Reform: Proposition 36 of 1984
Tax activist Howard Jarvis attempted an additional reform of
property taxation in California in 1984.69 Jarvis received a
sufficient amount of signatures to place Proposition 36 on the
November ballot.7" Billed as the "Save 13" proposition,
63. Henke, supra note 56, at 24-39; see Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 619,487 P.2d 1241,
1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 626 (1971) (mandating the equalization of school funding throughout
California).
64. See Douglas Shuit, The California Elections; Honig, School Officials Applaud Voter
Approval of Funding Measure, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1988, at 3 (stating the impetus for Proposition
98 and noting that Proposition 98 passed with 50.8% of the vote).
65. COMMIsSION, supra note 1, at 45.
66. Id.; see Shuit, supra note 64, at 3 (discussing the guarantee in Proposition 98 that any
excess revenue collected by California will be distributed to primary and secondary education).
67. Greg Lucas, State Squeeze Could Slash Schools Budget Up to $1 Billion, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 25, 1992, at Al.
68. Id.
69. Regional News, UPI, Aug. 29, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
70. Id. The effort was led by "neighborhood chairmen," who were to carry the message to the
voters, much like the effort in Proposition 13. Id. Proposition 36 received 1,012,450 signatures. Ben
Weberman, Political Spenders in California Wasted No Time Filling Loopholes in Proposition 13:
Here Comes Proposition 36, FORBES, Sept. 24, 1984, at 43.
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Proposition 36 was an attempt to clean up several loopholes in
Proposition 13. 7'
First, the initiative would have expanded the definition of a tax
to include fees, assessments, or fines.72 Proponents to Proposition
36 felt that the expanded definition was necessary because many
local governments attempted to bypass the provisions of
Proposition 13 by calling a tax by another name such as an
assessment, a fine, or a fee.73 Second, Proposition 36 would have
provided property owners with a rebate of over $1.7 billion.74
This rebate was to come in the form of a rollback for certain real
property of annual inflationary adjustment increases in assessed
value which occurred after the passage of Proposition 13.
Finally, the initiative would have required two-thirds approval by
the state Legislature for any new state or local tax, fees, or other
charges.76
Governor George Deukmejian, educators, the building industry,
and many others opposed Proposition 36 because of a perceived
drain on local government budgets and a creation of additional
inequities.77 Further, opponents of Proposition 36 were concerned
that the initiative would thwart California's economic growth
because it would restrict the ability of local government to raise
revenues through fees. 78  The battle over Proposition 36 was
71. Weberman, supra note 70, at 43; Robert Lindsey, California Ballot Questions Dim
Presidential Race, N.Y. TINES, Oct. 8, 1984, at B8.
72. Weberman, supra note 70, at 43; Voters to Decide on State Property Tax Proposals,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECS., Oct. 24, 1984, at GI [hereinafter "Voters to Decide"]; Michael Quint, Tax-
Reduction Plans Up for Vote in Four States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1984, at D1.
73. Weberman, supra note 70, at 43.
74. Voters to Decide, supra note 72, at G1.
75. Id.
76. Id.; see Mathew Naythons, Progeny of Proposition 13, TUIE, Nov. 5, 1984, at 26
(discussing the possible effects of Proposition 36).
77. See Louise Kehoe et al.,Another Proposition, FIN. TnMEs, Nov. 3, 1984, at 121 (discussing
the effects of Proposition 36 on schools and the public school boards' opposition to Proposition 36).
78. See California Voters Get Jarvis IV, ENGINE N Nnws-Rnc., Sept. 20, 1984, at 175
(discussing the California building industry's opposition to Proposition 36); Frank Thorsberg,
Finance, UPI, Oct. 4,1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing California cities'
opposition to Proposition 36); MetroWire, UPI, Sept. 19, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (discussing the California State University's formal opposition to Proposition 36); see also
California's Bond Rating Secured, UPI, Nov. 7, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File
(discussing the effects of Proposition 36 on the municipal bond market). Standard & Poor's, a New
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enormous.7 9 The total campaign expenditure for both sides was a
record $10.4 million.8" The initiative ultimately failed, capturing
only 45% of the public's vote.8" Thus, California voters left the
substance of Proposition 13 intact.8 2 However, Proposition 13 has
also faced scrutiny in the judicial system.
D. United States Supreme Court Review of State Property Tax
Systems Prior to Nordlinger v. Hahn
The United States Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
review state property taxation systems on a number of
occasions,,3  and has rarely overturned such systems.8 4 The Court
York investment company, placed California's municipal bonds on credit watch when Proposition
36 was placed on the ballot. Id.
79. Ted Volmer, Campaign Spending in Proposition 51 Nears Record, L.A. TIMES, May 24,
1986, at 20.
80. Id.
81. See California's Bond Rating Secured, UPI, Nov. 7, 1984, available in LEXIS, Ncxis
Library, UPI File (discussing the effect of the failure of Proposition 36); see also Franklin on
California's BondMarketRally, Nov. 7,1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File
(discussing the rally in the municipal bond market after the failure of Proposition 36). The credit
watch was immediately lifted when the results of the election were announced. Id. See generally
California, Michigan, and Nevada Voters Move to Black Tax Revolts, GOV'T EMPLOYEE REi Rpr.,
Nov. 12, 1984, at 2133 (discussing the national trend to halt tax revolts); Susan Tifft, Taking Matters
Into Their Own Hands; Citizens Weigh in On Taxes, Gambling, and False Teeth, TIME, Nov. 19,
1984, at 95 (discussing the failure of Proposition 36); Mark Starr, Tax Cuts, No!, Lotteries, Yesl,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 1984, at 62 (discussing the failure of Proposition 36).
82. See Koyama, supra note 19, at 1341 (discussing the fact that the judicial system has faced
the impact of Proposition 13 squarely while the legislature and the voters have left it alone). But see
Laura Saunders, No More Free Ride, FORBES, Dec. 17, 1984, at 168 (questioning whether the days
of a tax revolt are gone for good). See generally Kenneth Grace, Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts:
Another Proposition 13 or a Tax Reform Measure with Potential Constitutional Problems?, 15 N.E.
L. REv. 309 (1980) (discussing property tax reform in California); Charles H. Mercer, Jr. & Donald
R. Whittaker, Avoiding Another Proposition 13: The Needfor Reform of the North Carolina Property
Tax, 59 N.C. L. REV. 675 (1981) (discussing the need to avoid a property tax revolt); David F.
Sherwood, Challenging Inequality in the Connecticut Property Tax, 20 CoNN. L. REV. 479 (1988)
(discussing inequality in property taxation systems generally).
83. See, e.g., Nordlingerv. Hahn 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1 (1989); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. V. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1988); Attorney
General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986), Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612
(1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lakeshore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
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has heard challenges to real property taxation systems based on
alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause,85 the dormant
commerce clause,16 the First Amendment, 7  and the right to
travel.88 Generally, the Court has given great deference to state
legislatures and state voters in adopting systems of taxation,89 but
the Court has struck down two state property tax systems as
unconstitutional. 9'
One of the rare occasions where the United States Supreme
Court struck down a property tax system came in Louis K. Leggett
Co. v. Lee.91 The Court reviewed a Florida statute which taxed
individuals who owned stores in more than one county differently
than owners who owned stores in only one county.92 The
challenge was based on an alleged violation of the Equal Protection
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1958); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562 (1948); Charleston Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945); Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Carmichael v. Southern Coal &
Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (reviewing state
systems of taxation).
84. See Glennon, supra note 4, at 277-90 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
decisions reviewing property taxation systems).
85. Id.
86. See ROTUNDA & YoUNo, CoNsTITUmoNAL LAW 288-89 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing
commerce clause challenges to state real property taxation systems and indicating that state ad
valorem real property taxes easily meet the tests used to determine their constitutionality under the
dormant commerce clause).
87. See Glennon, supra note 4, at 277 (discussing First Amendment grounds for challenges
to state taxation systems).
88. See Hooper v. Bernadillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622-623 (1985) (holding that
a New Mexico statute which granted a special exemption to Vietnam veterans who were in New
Mexico before a certain date unconstitutional as violation of the constitutional right to travel).
89. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke, 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937). But see Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 448 U.S. 336, 343 (1988) (overturning Webster County's
system of taxation based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution); see also infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing the
Allegheny decision). See generally Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward
a More UnifiedApproach to ConstitutionalAdjudication?, 75 MICH. L. Ray. 1426 (1977) (discussing
the United States Supreme Court's review of state systems of taxation).
90. See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Louis K Leggett); infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing the
United States Supreme Court decision in Allegheny).
91. 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
92. Id at 519.
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Clause.93 The Court found no rational basis for taxing individuals
who owned stores in more than one county differently than
individuals who owned stores in only one county.9 4 The Court
therefore concluded that the statute was unconstitutional. 95 The
only other time the Court has struck down a property tax system
since 1934 came in one of the Court's most recent property
taxation decisions.
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County9 6 the
United States Supreme Court reviewed a system of real property
taxation in Webster County, West Virginia.97 A number of coal
companies, including the Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company,
challenged the constitutionality of the taxation system. 98 The coal
companies argued that the assessment policy systematically resulted
in appraisals which were excessive compared to other parcels
similarly situated.99 The companies asserted this excessive
taxation constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.10
93. Id. State taxation systems are most frequently challenged as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Glennon, supra note 4, at 290 (discussing equal
protection claims to state action). In regard to challenges under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Supreme Court has adopted three standards of review. JoHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14.1-14.4, at 568-605 (4th ed. 1991). First, the Supreme Court has used a
"rational basis" test when it finds no basis for giving truly independent examination to a government
classification. Id. at 568. Under a "rational basis" test, the Supreme Court gives a strong presumption
of constitutionality and invalidates only if the statute has no rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest. Id. The Court had adopted an intermediate standard of review where the classification is
based on gender and illegitimacy. Id. Under this standard, the classification must have a "substantial"
relationship to an important state interest. Id.; see Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding
a state statute in violation of the Equal Protection Clause under an intermediate standard of review
where the statute denied public education to the children of illegal aliens). Finally, the Court uses a
"strict scrutiny" test when the state uses a classification based on race or national origin. NoWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra § 14.3, at 575. Under the "strict scrutiny" test the classification must be necessary
to further a compelling state interest Id. § 14.38, at 575-76.
94. Leggett, 288 U.S. at 533.
95. kIL The dissent asserted there were numerous rational bases for the statute including the
necessity to distinguish between chains and locally owned stores. Id. at 541-86 (Brandeis, Cardozo,
and Stone, JJ., dissenting).
96. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
97. Id at 339.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
1782
1993 /Solving The Proposition 13 Puzzle
The West Virginia Constitution established a system of ad
valorem property taxation.10 1 The system assigned the duty of
ascertaining the value of property to the respective county
assessors. 2 Once the assessor had determined the actual value,
the assessed value was calculated by multiplying the actual value
by a specified percentage, which was fifty percent in Webster
County.'0 3 The Webster County assessor determined the actual
value of property by using the sale price of a parcel of
property." 4 In practice, this system of valuation established a
"welcome stranger" system much like the system created by
Proposition 13.10
The trial court determined that the Webster County system
discriminated against the coal companies in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution." The trial judge noted that Allegheny Coal's
tax assessments under the Webster County system were
dramatically in excess of those for comparable property. 7 The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the trial
court's decision holding that there was no support in the record for
a finding of intentional and systematic discrimination.' The
appeals court believed that tax assessments based on the price paid
101. See W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (providing for West Virginia's system of property
taxation).
102. Id. § lb. See also Glennon, supra note 4, at 264 (discussing the West Virginia system of
property taxation).
103. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § lb. This amount was to be determined by the West Virginia
Legislature. Glennon, supra note 4, at 264.
104. Glennon, supra note 4, at 264. There are three other principal methods used by assessors:
capitalization-of-income method, comparable sales method, and reproduction-less depreciation
method. Comment, The Road to Uniformity In Real Estate Taxation: Valuation and Appeal, 124 U.
PA. L. REv. 1418, 1430 (1973).
105. Glennon, supra note 4, at 264; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining a
"welcome stranger" system of property taxation).
106. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 448 U.S. 336, 340 (1988). The
companies had originally challenged the claim before the County Tax Commission, sitting as a
reviewer for the Board of Equalization and were denied relief. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 341. The court of appeals found that the Webster County system was in accord with
the West Virginia law, since the law required assessment based on "true and actual value." Id.
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for the property was an appropriate measure of the actual value for
the property."
The United States Supreme Court held that the Webster County
system violated of the Equal Protection Clause,"' because of the
varying assessments on similarly situated parcels."' However, the
Court noted that an assessment at 50% of the purchase price was
not enough to find a constitutional violation.112 The fairness of
one's share of the total property tax burden, the Court stated, must
be compared with other similarly situated properties. 13 The fact
that comparable property was undervaluated was the basis for
holding the Webster County system unconstitutional.
114
In a crucial footnote, the United States Supreme Court
specifically avoided reviewing the California system established by
Proposition 13 by indicating it would not decide in that case what
the ramifications would have been if the system of property
taxation established by Webster County was the law of the state
instead of the practice of a particular county tax assessor."'
Thus, the Court avoided the question of the constitutionality of
Proposition 13, but set the stage for the upcoming battle in
Nordlinger v. Hahn."6 Before the decision in Nordlinger, the
109. Id.
110. Id. at 343. The Court utilized a rational basis test to determine the Webster County
system's constitutionality. Id. The Court was unable to fid a rational basis for the Webster County
system. Id.; see supra note 93 (discussing the Court's use of a rational basis test). The Court utilizes
a rational basis test when it finds no basis to give truly independent examination to a government
classification. NowAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 93, § 14.1-14.4, at 568-605.
111. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 339.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 345.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 344 n.4; see Glennon, supra note 4, at 634 (discussing the fact that the Court left
this decision unresolved); Walter Hellerstein & James H. Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Have Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. TAX'N 306, 308-10 (1989) (discussing the implications of
Allegheny and indicating that the decision may jeopardize Proposition 13). See generally William
Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v.
County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REV. 87 (1990) (discussing the ramifications of the Allegheny
decision); John Vitha, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County of
West Virginia:. The Supreme Court Gives "Welcome Stranger" Tax Assessments A Cold Reception,
56 BROOK. L. REv. 1383 (1991) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Allegheny).
116. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992); see infra notes 217-268 and accompanying
text (discussing the decision in Nordlinger).
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California courts had adjudicated the constitutionality of
Proposition 13 on a number of occasions.
E. California's Judicial Review of Proposition 13
1. Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization: California's Affirmation of
Proposition 13
Just three months after the passage of Proposition 13, the
California Supreme Court heard a comprehensive attack on its
legitimacy in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization."7 The court invoked original
jurisdiction"8 stating that the issues presented were of such great
importance that they must be decided promptly." 9
The first claim was that Proposition 13 was a revision of the
California Constitution and not merely an amendment. 2 ' A
constitutional revision requires a convention and may not be
achieved through the initiative process.' Addressing this
argument, the court acknowledged that Proposition 13 resulted in
a number of substantial changes to the former system of property
taxation, but these changes operated within a narrow range.'
The court dismissed the claim by indicating that Proposition 13
was merely an amendment to the Constitution.'23
117. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
118. See FREimENnL, Er AL., CiviL PROCEDURE, § 1.2, at 6 (1985) (defining original
jurisdiction as the ability of court to hear a case in the first instance).
119. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 219,583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241. The court stated that
the level of inquiry was limited. Id. The economic or social wisdom or general propriety of the
initiative was not considered. Id. The sole function of the California Supreme Court was to evaluate
those fundamental challenges to the validity of article XIIIA as a whole. Id.
120. Id. at 221, 583 P.2d at 1284, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 242. The petitioner's argument was that
Proposition 13 represents such a far reaching and drastic change in the nature and the operation of
our governmental structure that it "revised" the California Constitution. Id.
121. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
122. Amador, 22 Cal. at 229, 583 P.2d at 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
123. Id. The court stated that Proposition 13 may represent a "legislative battering ram," but
it is an appropriate method for the initiative process. Id.
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Second, the petitioners claimed that Proposition 13 violated the
single-subject requirement for ballot measures.12 ' They argued
that Proposition 13 covered many subjects and its effect was to
usurp the function of government.'25 The court dismissed this
claim indicating that all parts of the initiative were reasonably
germane to one another in the sense that they offered a package of
property tax reform to the voters.
1 26
The petitioners' third claim was based on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 127 First, they asserted that the rollback of assessed
valuation to the 1975-76 assessed value discriminated against
owners of similarly situated property." 8 The court initially
acknowledged that this concern was premature since Proposition 13
had been in effect for only a few months and the claimed inequities
had yet to materialize. 129 However, the court proceeded to deal
with the issue of discrimination on the face of Proposition 13.130
Utilizing rational basis review,"' the court found a legitimate
government purpose for the system of assessed valuation.132 The
court held that an acquisition value system of taxation creates a
nexus between annual taxation and the original cost of the property
assures a stable revenue source for local government, and provides
124. Id. The California Constitution requires that an initiative may not "embrace more than one
subject." CAL. CONST art. II, § 8(d); see Steven W. Ray, California Initiative Process: Demise of the
Single-Subject Rule, 14 PAc. L. L 1095, 1109 (1983) (indicating the lack of enforcement of the
single-subject rule).
125. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 232, 583 P. 2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 232, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see
supra note 93 (discussing the analysis of an equal protection claim).
128. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 233, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250. Proposition 13
mandated that property assessments be "rolled back" or reduced to their 1975-76 levels from the
1978-79 level of assessments. Id.
129. Id. The court stated that it is the usual rule that courts will not decide an issue unless it
is crucial to the disposition of the case. Id. However, the court elected to treat the Equal Protection
issue as constituting an attack upon the face of the article itself, in order to advise the assessors of
California whether to follow the assessment procedures within Proposition 13. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The court stated that a system of taxation will be upheld as long it is supported by a
rational basis to support it. Id.
132. Id. at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
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a uniform taxation based on acquisition value.'33 All of these
state interests were found to be legitimate.'
The petitioners further claimed that the two-thirds voting
requirement for enacting special taxes unduly discriminated in the
favor of those casting negative votes.1 35 The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court had upheld a sixty percent voting
requirement for passage of general obligation bonds, 136  and
indicated that since persons who vote in favor of a tax are not a
definite representative class they do not require equal
protection. 137
Fourth, the petitioners claimed that Proposition 13 impaired the
constitutional right to travel. 13  The court asserted that all
property owners, including past and future property owners, benefit
by the adoption of a "welcome stranger" system. 139 The court
cited the reduction in inflationary increases, the limitations of tax
rates, and the ability to accurately predict future tax liability as
factors which benefit all residents."4 Based on these factors, the
court concluded that the new property tax system impaired travel
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Court will only extend Equal Protection analysis to distinct classifications of
individuals. NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra note 93, § 14.1-14.4, at 568-605. Intermediate level of
review is generally used in gender and illegitimacy cases. Id. Strict scrutiny is used when there is a
classification based on race. Id.; see supra note 93 (discussing the standards of Equal Protection
review).
136. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 237, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (citing Mihaly v.
Westbrook, 403 U.S. 915 (1971)).
137. Id.
138. Id. Although the right to travel is not explicit in the United States Constitution, the right
to travel has been recognized throughout the history of the United States as a fundamental
constitutional right. ELY, DEMoCRAcY AND DimusT 177 (1980). It has been suggested that the right
to travel is so basic that it did not need to be included in the Constitution. NowAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 93, § 14.38, at 874. Another argument has been that the right to travel is contained in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 4 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The United
States Supreme Court has held that there is an inherent right to travel between the states. Crandall
v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 47-49 (1849). The Court has generally used a strict scrutiny test when
reviewing classifications based on new and old residents. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969). However, in other cases, the Court has utilized a "reasonableness" test. NOwAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 93, § 14.38, at 877.
139. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 238, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
140. Id.
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no more than the old system.14' Thus, the court held that the
petitioner's right to travel was not impaired. 42
Fifth, the petitioners asserted that Proposition 13 was invalid as
it impaired the ability to contract within the state.143  The
petitioners pointed to a number of municipal obligations which did
not require voter approval prior to the enactment of Proposition
13.'" The court stated that this claim was actually premature
since nothing on the face of Proposition 13 indicated any
impairment of contractual obligations. 14
5
Finally, the petitioners raised two concerns with the ballot
measure itself. 46 The petitioner claimed that the title, "Initiative
Constitutional Amendment-Property Tax Limitation," was
misleading because it implied that only property taxes would be
affected when other "special" taxes were also affected. 147 The
court held that although the title may have been misdirected, it
substantially complied with the law. 48  The petitioners further
asserted that Proposition 13 was vague and ambiguous. 149  The
court acknowledged the fact that Proposition 13 was ambiguous,
but stated that ambiguous provisions are to be resolved in
accordance with other rules of construction.5 The court noted
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution states, "No state shall... pass any
law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." This has been generally interpreted to mean that states
are prevented from passing any legislation that would alleviate the commitments of one party to a
contract or make enforcement of the contract unreasonably difficult. NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
93, § 11.8, 395-96. The primary intent behind drafting the clause was to prohibit states from adopting
laws that would interfere with contracts of state citizens. Id.
144. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 238, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
145. Id. at 239-42, 583 P.2d at 1295-98, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253-56.
146. Id. at 243-57, 583 P.2d at 1298-1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256-59.
147. Id. at 243, 583 P.2d at 1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256. The petitioners believed the title
indicated that only property taxes were affected, when in reality sales and local state taxes were also
affected by the initiative. Id.
148. Id. at 244, 583 P.2d at 1299, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257. The court believed that the title was
sufficient since the principal purpose of the initiative was directed at property taxation. Id.
149. Id. The petitioners asserted that the existence of several ambiguous words and phres in
Proposition 13 prevented a rational and uniform interpretation of the initiative. Id.
150. Id. at 248, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259. The court believed that the usual
manner of interpretation would be used to interpret Proposition 13. Id. The court stated that a
common-sense interpretation which would meet the changing conditions and the growing needs of
the people would be appropriate. Id.
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that the language within Proposition 13 was not so vague as to
render it unenforceable, because a common-sense construction
would allow the provisions to be interpreted.151
In the end, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 13
in its entirety.15 2 Since then, the California Supreme Court has
refused to hear any substantive challenges to the entirety of
Proposition 13.153 However, two cases at the appellate court level
have posed strong challenges to Proposition 13.154
2. R.H. Macy's & Co. v. Contra Costa County: The Case
that Allowed Stephanie Nordlinger to Reach the United
States Supreme Court
R.H. Macy & Co. [hereinafter "Macy's"], operated a
department store in Contra Costa County, California, through two
subsidiaries.155 The store was established in 1967.156 In July
1986, Macy's underwent a corporate restructuring which constituted
151. Id.
152. See Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 15 (discussing the ramifications of the Amador decision
including the implementation of Proposition 13 and future judicial challenges); Rappaport, supra note
29, at 244-51 (reviewing the decision in Amador and the constitutionality of Proposition 13). Chief
Justice Rose Bird, in a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, indicated her support for each of
the court's holdings except one. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 248-57, 583 P.2d at 1302-08, 149 Cal. Rptr.
at 260-65 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Justice Bird's belief, Proposition
13 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 249, 583 P. 2d at 1303, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Bird,
CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bird cited the inequalities established by the
" welcome stranger" system as well as the inherent arbitrariness it creates as treating the citizens of
the state discriminately. Id. Justice Bird believed that the majority's holding approved a system of
assessment which systematically assigns different values to property of equal worth without any
rational basis. Id.
153. See R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa County, No. S019216, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 943, at
*1 (Feb. 28, 1991) (denying review of Proposition 13).
154. See R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa County, 226 Cal. App. 3d 352,370,276 Cal. Rptr.
530, 541 (1990) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 13), petition for cert.
denied, No. S019216, 1992 Cal. Sup Ct. LEXIS 943, at *1 (Feb. 28, 1991); Northwest Fin., Inc. v.
Board of Equalization, 229 Cal. App. 3d 198, 207, 280 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1991) (upholding the
constitutionality of Proposition 13),petition for cert denied, No. S021146, 1991 Cal. Sup. Ct LEXIS
3204 (July 11, 1991),petition for cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992); see also infra notes 155-213
and accompanying text (discussing the decisions in RH. Macy & Co. and Northwest).
155. RH. Macy & Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d at 356, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
156. Id.
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a change in ownership under Proposition 13.157 This technical
change of ownership caused the real property owned by the
company to be .reassessed at a value of $11,685,026, which was
over $7 million more than the previous assessed value. 158 Since
Macy's owned the property prior to the enactment of Proposition
13, the property had experienced only annual two percent
adjustments in assessed value.'59 As a result of the reassessment
due to change in ownership, Macy's faced nearly $73,000 in
additional property taxes,"0 and a property tax bill that was 2.5
greater than its competitors; though the properties were
comparable. 161 Macy's filed an application for a reduction with
the assessment. appeals board and a claim with the county for a
refund both of which were denied.1 62 Macy's then filed suit
seeking declaratory relief and a refund. 6 3
The California Court of Appeals for the First District in RH.
Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa County," rejected Macy's based
on the California Supreme Court's holding in Amador.65 Macy's
attempted to distinguish Anador on the ground that Amador merely
decided the constitutionality of article XIIIA, section 2."
However, the court of appeals rejected this claim indicating that the
whole of article XIEIA was upheld in the Amador decision. 67
157. Id. at 357, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
158. Id. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a) (requiring a reassessment based on a change of
ownership); supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing the crucial elements within article
XIIIA).
159. RH. Macy & Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d at 357, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
160. Id.
161. Id. The Macy's department store is situated at Sun Valley Mall, which includes LC.
Penney and Sears Roebuck and Co. department stores. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 26 Cal. App. 3d 352,276 Cal. Rptr. 530,531 (1990). The trial court rendered a judgment
for the county. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Id.
165. Id. at 359,276 Cal. Rptr. at 534; see Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259 (1978)
(upholding the constitutionality of Proposition 13 based on numerous grounds); supra notes 117-154
and accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme Court decision in Amador).
166. RH. Macy & Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d at 360, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
167. Id. at 361, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 535. The court of appeals indicated that the California
Supreme Court considered Amador to be a complete attack on Proposition 13 in both the majority
and dissenting opinions. Id.
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Macy's also asserted that Amador only applied to residential
property and left the question of commercial property open.16
The court of appeals dismissed this contention by indicating that
the decision did not distinguish between residential and commercial
property and that the state interests identified in Amador were
equally applicable to commercial property.16 9
Macy's central attack focused on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Allegheny, 170 arguing that it indicated that
California's property tax system was invalid for two reasons.171
First, Macy's asserted that since equality of taxation cannot be
achieved under Proposition 13, the system was
unconstitutional. 172  Macy's believed that the Equal Protection
Clause, after the Allegheny decision, required seasonable attainment
of equality in taxation. 173 The court of appeals rejected this
contention because of the different factual and legal background in
Allegheny and the fact that Allegheny expressly refused to pass
upon the constitutionality of Proposition 13.'74 Second, Macy's
asserted that the system of property taxation in California was a
per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it created
a dramatic disparity in taxation.175 The court of appeals noted
that Allegheny failed to establish any per se rules for property tax
168. Id. at 362, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
169. Id. The court of appeals stated that the policy reasons stated in Amador in order to justify
its reasonableness, including the certainty of taxation, are equally applicable to commercial property
as to residential property. Id.
170. Id. at 363, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 537; see Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County,
448 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) (overturning the constitutionality of a West Virginia county's system of
property taxation similar to Proposition 13); supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text (discussing
the Allegheny decision).
171. RH. Macy & Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
172. Id. Macy's claimed that under Allegheny there must be a seasonable attainment of rough
equality of taxation of equal property. Id.
173. Ia. at 364, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
174. Id. at 364, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 538. The court of appeals stated that the West Virginia
Constitution did not authorize the system of taxation in Allegheny, while California's system of
taxation is based on Proposition 13. Id. The court of appeals noted the footnote in Allegheny which
refused to pass on the issue of California's system of property taxation. Id.
175. Id. at 365, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 538. Macy's believed that the disparity of taxation of nearly
three to one was evidence of such disparate treatment of property to be per se unconstitutional. Id.
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systems. 176 Instead, the court held that states have wide latitude
in setting property tax rates so as long as there is a rational state
policy behind the taxation system. 177  Since Amador asserted
several grounds of rational state policy, the court held that there
was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause.1
7 8
Additionally, Macy's asserted that Proposition 13 interfered
with its constitutional right to travel. 179 Macy's claimed that an
unequal taxation scheme under Proposition 13 impedes the free
movement of people because it imposes a heavier tax burden on
newly arrived property owners than on established California
residents."8 ' The court of appeals rejected this contention by
indicating that Proposition 13 neither imposes any direct restriction
on the right to travel, nor discriminated against non-California
property owners, nor did it impose duration of residence
restrictions.' 8'
Finally, Macy's argued that Proposition 13 placed an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because it gave a
competitive edge to established property owners."8 2 The court of
appeals rejected this argument based on three findings."8 3 First,
the court of appeals indicated that Proposition 13 was not a
restriction on interstate commerce because it taxed only real
176. Id. Instead, the court of appeals indicated that the Allegheny decision merely restated the
principle that a state system of property taxation would be upheld ifit was founded upon a reasonable
state policy. Id.
177. Id. at 366, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
178. Id. at 367,276 Cal. Rptr. at 539. Amador indicated that California bases for Proposition
13 included: Achievement of certainty and predictability in taxation, assurance of a stable revenue
source for local government, and uniform taxation based on acquisition value. Id. at 362, 276 Cal,
Rptr. at 536.
179. Id. at 367,276 Cal. Rptr. at 540. Macy's claimed that unequal taxation under Proposition
13 impedes the free movement of people since it imposes a heavier burden on newly arrived property
owners than on established property owners. Id.; see supra note 138 (discussing the foundations for
the constitutional right to travel).
180. RH. Macy & Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d at 367, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
181. Id. The court of appeals stated that Proposition 13 is neutral and uniform in its application
and does not discriminate directly or indirectly based upon residency. Id. at 368, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
540.
182. Id. at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
183. Id.
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property located within the state.1 14 Second, the court indicated
that there was no proof of any burden on interstate or foreign
commerce.185 Third, the court of appeals indicated that the
interstate commerce argument was merely a restatement of Macy's
right to travel argument which was rejected by Amador. 8 6 Hence,
the court of appeals rejected Macy's contentions and upheld the
validity of Proposition 13.287
The California Supreme Court refused to hear Macy's
appeal,' but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review this decision."8 9 Many California property owners,
fearing that the Proposition 13 system would be struck down,
began a boycott movement against Macy's.' Fearing a massive
consumer boycott, Macy's withdrew its petition to the United
States Supreme Court at the last minute. 9 Shortly after the RH.
184. Id. The court of appeals stated that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a
tax on property does not interfere with interstate commerce. Id.; see Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (indicating that interstate commerce deals with the flow of goods and
services between and among the several states).
185. R1H. Macy & Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 541. The court of appeals
indicated that before a state tax or regulation can be declared unconstitutional there must be a
showing of a burden on interstate commerce. Id.
186. Id. at 370, 276 Cal Rptr. at 541.
187. Id.
188. See R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa County, No. S019216, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 943, at
*I (Feb. 28, 1991) (denying review of Macy's challenge to Proposition 13). The California Supreme
Court has denied all challenges to Proposition 13 based on its decision in Amador. See supra notes
117-154 (discussing the decision in Amador).
189. See Richard C. Reuben, Prop. 13 Up in AirAfter Macy's Retreat, L.A. DAILY J., June 11,
1991, at 7 (discussing the grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court).
190. Id.; see also Vlae Kersbner, Supreme Court Agrees to Rule on Prop. 13 - Los Angeles
Case Claims Overtaxation of New Buyers, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 1991, at Al (discussing Macy's
withdrawal of United States Supreme Court review); AssEMBLY REVENUE AND TAXATION
COMMITrEE, LEGAL CHALLENGES TO PROPOSTION 13: IMPLICATIONS FOR CALIFORNIA, AN INTERIM
HEARING BRIEFING BOOK, at 4 (Oct. 1991) [hereinafter "ASSEMBLY BRIEFING BOOK"] (indicating
that fear of boycott resulting in Macy's removing its petition to the United States Supreme Court).
191. Reuben, supra note 189. The reason that Macy's withdrew its petition for certiorari was
that it preferred the embarrassment of an ill-advised high court petition over the loss of business and
customer good-will that might have resulted from the threaten boycotts. Id. After Macy's withdrawal,
it was apparent that the case brought by Stephanie Nordlinger, also challenging Proposition 13, would
reach the United States Supreme Court. Id.
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Macy & Co. decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeals
reviewed a similar case challenging Proposition 13.192
3. Northwest Financial, Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization: Reaffirnation of Amador
Northwest Financial Corporation purchased a residential
dwelling in La Jolla, California, for $730,000.'9' The previous
owner purchased the home for $175,839.194 Thus, Northwest's
property tax liability was four times greater than that of the
previous owner.195 Northwest filed a complaint against the State
Board of Equalization based on two grounds.'96 First, Northwest
asserted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, primarily
grounded on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Allegheny.197 Second, the complaint alleged a violation of
Northwest's constitutional right to travel. 98 The trial court
rejected Northwest's claims and granted the defendant's
demurrer. 199
In affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth District, in Northwest Financial, Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization,0" first addressed the equal protection claim. 20 1 It
192. See Northwest Fin., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 229 Cal. App. 3d 198,207,280 Cal.
Rptr. 24,29 (1991) (upholding the constitutionality of Proposition 13),petition for cert. denied, No.
S021146, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 3204, (July 11, 1991),peition for cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992);
see also infra notes 193-216 (discussing the decision in Northwest).
193. Northwest, 229 Cal. App. 3d. at 201 n.1, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.l.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 201, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
197. Id.; see Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 448 U.S. 336, 343 (1989)
(overturning the constitutionality of a West Virginia county's system of property taxation similar to
Proposition 13);supranotes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing theAllegheny decision); supm
note 93 (discussing challenges based on equal protection grounds).
198. Northwest; 229 Cal. App. at 201, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 25; see supra note 138 and
accompanying text (discussing the constitutional right to travel).
199. Northwest 229 Cal. App. at 201, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 25; see Taxation, Budget and
Accounting, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcs., Aug. 14, 1989, at 155 (discussing the trial court's decision in
Northwest and indicating that the California appeals court would be the next court to decide the
constitutionality of Proposition 13); Sandy Hock, San Diego Suit Seeks Tax Refind, SAN DEao Bus.
J., May 22, 1989, at I (discussing the Northwest case at the trial court level).
200. Northwes4 29 Cal. App. 3d. at 202, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
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cited the rationales presented in Amador as rational bases for the
property tax system established by Proposition 13,2 and noted
that no violation of the Equal Protection Clause was found by the
California Supreme Court in Amador. °3 In Northwest's case, the
court found no distinction between the Amador decision and
Northwest's claims;2  therefore, Northwest's assertion that
Allegheny required a reevaluation of the Amador decision was
rejected.0 5 Since the Allegheny decision was grounded on the
unequal treatment of taxpayers who were in the same class and
Proposition 13 places subsequent homeowners in a different class
than prior homeowners, the court of appeals found no effect on the
California Supreme Court's decision in Amador.2"
Northwest's second claim that its constitutional right to travel
was violated by Proposition 13 was rejected by the court as
well.20 7 The court indicated that state law implicated the right to
travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is
its primary objective, or when it utilizes any classification which
serves to penalize that right.2"8 Furthermore, when a classification
drawn by a state burdens the right to migrate, the state is
201. Id. at 201,280 Cal. Rptr. at 25. Northwest argued that it had set forth an equal protection
claim based on the alleged disparity between comparable properties which arisen in the 12 years since
the passage of Proposition 13. Id.
202. Id. at 203, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 26. Amador presented several rationales for Proposition 13:
Achievement of certainty and predictability in taxation, assurance of a stable revenue source for local
government, and uniform taxation based on acquisition value. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch.
Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 232-37, 583 P.2d 1281, 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239,
250-53 (1978); see supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales presented
in Amador).
203. Id; see supra notes 117-154 (analyzing the decision in Amador).
204. Northwest, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 204, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The court of appeals found,
contrary to Northwest's suggestion, that the Amador decision did not confine its analysis to the
different treatment of taxpayers assessed at the 1975-76 tax base level, but extends its holding to the
different treatment among all taxpayers subject to the post-1975 acquisition value taxation system.
Id.
205. Id.; see supra notes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Allegheny).
206. Northwest, 229 Cal. App. at 204,280 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The court of appeals also noted that
the decision in Allegheny left the question of the constitutionality of California's decision undecided.
Id.; see supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text (discussing the footnote in Allegheny which left
open the question of the constitutionality of California's system of property taxation).
207. Northwest, 229 Cal. App. at 206,280 Cal. Rptr. at 29; see supra note 138 (discussing the
foundations of the constitutional right to travel).
208. Northwest, 229 Cal. App. at 206, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
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compelled to articulate a justification. 9 Since Proposition 13 did
not create a classification based on residency or length of
residency, the court held there was no burden on migration.210 To
illustrate the lack of classification, the Northwest court cited the
discussions in Amador and KH. Macy & Co. which asserted that
both old and new homeowners benefit by the "welcome stranger"
system of property taxation. 211 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth District rejected Northwest's challenge to
Proposition 13.22 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari on the day it decided Nordlinger v. Hahn.213
II. NoRDLiNGER V. HAHN: THE FINAL DECISION?
A. Factual and Procedural History
In 1988, Stephanie Nordlinger purchased a three-bedroom home
in the Baldwin Hills area of Southern California several miles from
downtown Los Angeles.2 4 The purchase price of the home was
$170,000 and the accompanying annual property tax bill was
209. Id. The court stated that the right to travel protects residents of a state from being
disadvantaged or treated differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from other
similarly situated residents. Id.
210. Id. The court stated that Northwest's argument miseharacterized Proposition 13. Id. The
court indicated that this system of property taxation does not discriminate based on residency. Id. The
court noted that long time residents, new residents, and non residents were subjected to te same
acquisition value system. Id.
211. Northwest, 229 Cal. App. at 207, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (citing Amador Valley Joint Union
High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 239, 257 (1988) and R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra Costa Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d 352, 370, 276
Cal. Rptr. 530,541 (1990),petition for cert. denied, No. S019216, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 943, at *1 (Feb.
28, 1992)); see Tax Decisions and Rulings, DAILY REP. FOR EXECS., Apr. 19, 1991, at K5 (discussing
the decision in Northwest).
212. See ASSEMBLY BIEnNa BooK, supra note 190, at 4-5 (discussing the Northwest
decision).
213. 112 S. CL 2326 (1992); see Justices Let Stand Tenth Circuit Decision Concerning Profit
Motive, U.S.L.W. (Daily Ed.), July 1, 1992, at 1 (indicating that the United States Supreme Court
denied review of the Northwest case on the same day as the Nordlinger decision).
214. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2330 (1992). See Vlae Kershner, Homeowner Who Challenged
the Law, S.F. CitRON., Feb. 18, 1992, at A8 (discussing the ramifications of Stephanie Nordlinger's
home purchase and filing of complaint); Vlae Kershner, Supreme CourtActs Friendly to Proposition
13, S.F. CHmoN., Feb. 26, 1992, at Al (indicating that Justice Harry Blackmun stated that Ms.
Nordlinger knew what she was getting into when she purchased her home).
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$1,700.215 Some of Ms. Nordlinger's neighbors, who purchased
their homes prior to the passage of Proposition 13, paid as little as
$320 annually for comparable parcels of land.216
After learning of the decision in Allegheny,217  Stephanie
Nordlinger filed suit against the Los Angeles County tax assessor
for a tax refund and a declaration that her property tax was
unconstitutional.21 The complaint alleged two grounds: First, the
system of property taxes created disparities in classes which
violated the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause;219 and
second, the system prevented her from exercising her constitutional
right to travel.22° The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss the claims.22' The California Court of Appeals for the
Second Appellate District, citing Amador and distinguishing
Allegheny, affirmed the trial court's decision.222  The Supreme
Court of California denied review based on its decision in
Amador.223 Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.224 The United States Supreme Court, in an
215. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2330.
216. Id. This is a ratio of approximately 5.3 to 1. Id.
217. 488 U.S. 336 (1989); see supra notes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing the
Allegheny decision).
218. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at2330; see Stephanie Nordlinger, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMS,
Feb. 24, 1992, at B4 (indicating that her complaint was not intended to overturn California's property
tax system in its entirety since article XIIIA contains a severability clause for judicial review in
section 6). Ms. Nordlinger stated that her claim was merely to the unconstitutionality of the
provisions in article XJIIA which provide for the acquisition value assessment scheme. Id.
219. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the
claim of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
220. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2330; see supra note 138 (discussing the foundations for the
constitutional right to travel).
221. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2330.
222. Id.; see Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990), aff'd,
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (stating that the Supreme Court of California already had
rejected a constitutional challenge to the disparities in taxation resulting from Proposition 13).
223. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 (1992).
224. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991); see Geoffery A. Campbell, State Autonomy,
Finance Have Much at Stake When Supreme Court Resumes Session May 18, THE BoND BUYm,
May 6, 1992, at 1 (discussing the importance of the Nordlinger decision on the municipal finance
markets).
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eight-to-one decision, upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 13
in Nordlinger v. Hahn.2z
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Harry Blackmun writing for the majority,226 used a
rational basis test to determine whether the system of taxation
violated the Equal Protection Clause.227 This application of the
rational basis standard was consistent with the Court's general
policy of giving states great deference in establishing systems of
taxation.2 ' Blackmun asserted that California has two key
interests in the taxation system under Proposition 13.229 First, the
state has an interest in local neighborhood preservation and
discouraging rapid turnover of property.230 Justice Blackmun
indicated that the state may legitimately structure its tax system to
discourage rapid turnover in order to prevent the displacement of
225. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. 2326,2336; see Scott Armstrong, California's Prop. 13 Faces High
Court Challenge, CHIusTAN SCi. MONITOR, Feb, 24, 1992, at 8 (outlining the issues presented in the
Nordlinger case).
226. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2328. Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. Justice Blackmun did not hesitate
to criticize Proposition 13. David G. Savage, U.S. Justices Uphold Prop. 13 Tax Structure, L.A.
TIMEs, June 19, 1992, at Al. In comments from the bench, Justice Blackmun called the system
"distasteful" and stated that it would be unlikely that other governments would copy such a system.
Id.
227. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2332; see, e.g., Clebume v. Cleburne Living Cir., 473 U.S. 432
(1985), Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 446 (1981), United States R.R, Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (establishing the test for violation of the Equal Protection Clause);
supra note 93 (discussing the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause).
228. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22 (1985) (stating that states are given large
leeway in establishing taxation systems); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1983) (indicating that states have large latitude in creating broad classifications and distinctions with
taxation systems).
229. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2333. Justice Blackmun indicated that the Court had no difficulty
in finding at least two rational bases for Proposition 13. Id. Justice Antonin Scalia, in oral arguments,
indicated his approval for Proposition 13 by calling it, "rough and ready, but close enough for
government work.- Robert Reinhold, Tax Battle in California Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y. TItES,
Mar. 1, 1992 at I1.
230. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2333. After the United States Supreme Court's decision,
Stephanie Nordlinger indicated that she believes that the rest of the country gets by with market-value
property taxes and they have reasonably stable neighborhoods. Kershner, supra note 214, at, Al; see
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926) (holding that local neighborhood preservation
is a legitimate state interest).
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lower income families and locally owned businesses.23' Second,
the state may determine that new owners do not have the same
reliance interest warranting protection from higher taxes.232 The
majority indicated that a state may deny the new owner a right to
establish the same assessed value as similarly situated property
since existing owners have vested expectations in their property
which are deserving of protection.233
Nordlinger argued that Proposition 13 could not be
distinguished from the West Virginia system overturned in
Allegheny."' The majority, however, found that the Webster
County system was in direct violation of the West Virginia
Constitution, while California's system was provided for in the
California Constitution and was approved by a voter initiative.23
Justice Blackmun indicated that Allegheny was the rare situation
where the taxation system established by Webster County was
without any plausible inference that it furthered the interests of an
"acquisition value" system of property taxation. 6
Nordlinger also argued that the unfairness in Proposition 13
was made worse by its exemptions.237  Justice Blackmun
disagreed stating that the exemptions furthered legitimate state
interests including the concern that older persons should not be
discouraged from moving to a residence more suitable to their
changing family size or income and the interests in the continuity
and stability of neighborhoods.23
231. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2333.
232. Id.
233. Id. The Court indicated that an existing owner does not have a decision whether to avoid
high property taxes by not purchasing, whereas the new owner can decide prior to purchasing. Id.
The Court had previously indicated that legitimate reliance and expectation interests do not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. Id.; see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schs., 487 U.S. 450,465 (1988);
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 746 (1984) (stating that the protection of reasonable reliance
interests is not only a viable governmental function, but it is an exceedingly persuasive justification).
234. Nordlinger, 112 S. CL at 2334. See Proposition 13 Case Goes To Court (National Public
Radio Broadcast Feb. 25, 1992) (transcript available on LEXIS, Nexis library, CURRNT file)
(interviewing both sides of the Nordlinger case and examining their arguments).
235. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2334.
236. Id. at 2334-35.
237. Id. at 2335.
238. Id.
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Additionally, the Court rejected Nordlinger's right to travel
claim." 9 Nordlinger argued that the exemptions in Proposition 13
impeded her right to travel since they distinguish between
taxpayers based on length of residence.240 Justice Blackmun
indicated that Nordlinger had no standing to bring such a
claim.241 First, she had not moved or attempted to move
herself.242 Second, she had not identified any obstacle preventing
others from bringing their own claim, nor shown any special
relationship with others' rights.243
C. Concurring Opinion by Justice Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred with the majority because
he believed that Proposition 13 was constitutional, but believed that
the Court should explicitly overrule Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Webster County.2' Justice Thomas indicated that Allegheny
was indistinguishable from Nordlinger.24 He agreed with the
Court that there were rational bases for California's system of
taxation based on the two state interests identified by the
majority.246 However, Justice Thomas believed that the Webster
County system in Allegheny had the same rational bases as the
239. Id. at 2331.
240. Id. at 2332.
241. Id.
242. Id
243. Id. In a final comment, Justice Blackmun criticized Proposition 13 by indicating that it
has benefited the long-standing wealthy citizens of California. Id. at 2336. It appears that a new
resident to California could bring a claim based on a violation of a right to travel, since the Court
left this decision unresolved. Savage, supra note 226, at Al. Governor Pete Wilson praised the ruling
stating that property-tax controls fostered a positive business climate. Seth Mydans, The Supreme
Court: Backers of the '78 Tax Revolt Hail Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 1992, at A23.
244. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2336 (Thomas, J., concurring). See Jonathan Marshall, Big Test
for Government Regulations: Thomas May Shift Supreme Court on Economic Rights, S.F. ClRON.,
Nov. 25, 1991, at BI. The article indicates that Justice Thomas is likely to leave his biggest mark
in the area of economic rights. Id. In a speech before the Pacific Research Institute, Justice Thomas
indicated that an attack on economic rights is an attack on all rights. Id. Justice Thomas' views in
this area could shape the Court's views in the years to come. Id.
245. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2336. (Thomas, I., concurring).
246. Id. at 2338 (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text
(indicating the rational bases stated by the majority for Proposition 13).
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system in Nordlinger.247  Justice Thomas asserted that the
majority's belief that the Webster County system violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it was in contravention of state law was
incorrect.248 He further contended that a violation of state law is
not in and of itself a violation of the United States
Constitution.249 Without specifically overruling Allegheny, he
believed that equal protection jurisprudence would be left in
disarray, since in his belief Proposition 13 and the property taxation
scheme in Alllegheny are indistinguishable.' 0
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which
he asserted that Proposition 13 violated the Equal Protection
Clause." Justice Stevens stated that he could not comprehend
the furtherance of legitimate state interests where such disparities
were present."2 Justice Stevens contended that the standard of
review for systems of taxation is properly deferential, but he could
247. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2338 (Thomas, J., concurring).
248. Id. But see J. Andrew Hoemer, When States Choose Inequality: High Court Mulls
Proposition 13, TAx NoTEs, Mar. 2, 1992, at 1057 (indicating that Justice Scalia stated that it is not
the desire of the Court to review every decision by a state official to see if it is in compliance with
state law). Justice Anthony Kennedy asserted at oral argument that a suggestion that Allegheny stands
for the proposition that if there is a violation of state law by state officials then there is a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause would be great expansion of equal protection law. Id. at 1056.
249. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2339 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1, 8 (1944) (holding that failure to comply with state law is not in and of itself a violation of the
United States Constitution).
250. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2340 (Thomas, J., concurring).
251. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2341 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
252. Id. at 2342 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens contended that the property taxation
disparity in residential property is as great as 17 to 1, while as great at 500 to 1 in vacant property.
Id. Justice Stevens stated that Proposition 13 had provided successful investors in California with a
tremendous windfall. Id. Justice Stevens asserted that since these property owners were guaranteed
that their property taxes would not increase greater than two percent annually, they realized a smaller
share of the property tax burden than new property owners. Id. In oral arguments, Justice Stevens
stated that Proposition 13 created a class of nobility in California depending on whether your parents
bought property in California. Hoerner, supra note 248 at 1057. Stevens believes that the ability to
transfer property between parents and children, under the exemption in Proposition 13, allows
property to be passed down through the ages without an increase in property taxes. Id. Stevens also
indicated that there is no relationship between taxes paid and services rendered. Id.
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find no justification for such a taxation scheme.23 Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for not analyzing the interests of the state
more carefully. 4 Under his view, Proposition 13 operates too
broadly and too indiscriminately1 5 and prevents the transfer of
unimproved property as well as inhibits the mobility of settled
families. 6 He saw neighborhood preservation as a legitimate
state interest, but the giant tax windfall for those who purchased
their homes before 1978 was completely irrational, in his view."
Justice Stevens found that the second interest identified by the
majority, the fact that new homeowners do not have a reliance
interest warranting protection from higher property taxes, was
misguided. 8 He believed that there was a difference between
pre-Proposition 13 buyers of property and post-Proposition 13
buyers. 9 In Justice Stevens opinion, it was irrational to treat
persons differently based on the date they purchased property.260
He noted a difference between those who were immediately
effected by Proposition 13 through a property tax reduction and
those who had to bear the burden when they purchased a new
home.26' Thus, the classifications drawn by Proposition 13 were
arbitrary, unreasonable, and failed to further a state interest.262
Despite Justice Steven's dissent, the message the Supreme Court
sent is clear: The system of property taxation under Proposition 13
is constitutional.
253. Nordlinger, 112 S. CL at 2343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 2345 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255, Id.
256. Id. at 2346 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2347 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 2348 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Id.
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II. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. Impact on Proposition 13
The Nordlinger v. Hahn decision has a number of immediate
effects on property taxation systems throughout the United States.
In California, the Nordlinger decision affirms the validity of
Proposition 13 on equal protection grounds.263 Nationwide, the
affirmation of a "welcome stranger" system may open the door for
other states to adopt similar approaches to property tax
assessment.2 4
The Nordlinger decision insures that Proposition 13 will
continue to be the law in California absent a change by the
electorate.265 The United States Supreme Court held that there is
no equal protection violation in the type of "welcome stranger"
system established by Proposition 13.2" If rapidly increasing
property tax levels become a dilemma for voters in other states,
they may be apt to adopt similar property taxation systems.267
The courts have noted several reasons why such a system would be
beneficial including a taxation system which applies uniformly to
every property owner, neighborhood preservation, and discouraging
263. See supra notes 214-263 and accompanying text (discussing the Nordlinger decision
including the affirmation of Proposition 13 on equal protection grounds).
264. Kershner, supra note 214, at AS. David Keating, executive vice president of the National
Taxpayer's Union, has indicated that the Supreme Court's decision in Nordlinger has given the green
light to Proposition 13 type measures. Id Since property taxation is viewed as high in a number of
areas in the United States, voters may turn to a "welcome stranger" type of a system to attempt to
control rising property tax rates. Id. But see Jonathan Fuerbringer, N.Y. TaMEs, Nov. 5, 1992, at D17
(indicating that a property tax initiative in Michigan on the November 1992 ballot failed which would
have cut current property tax levels and limited increases in the future).
265. See While Prop. 13 Wins In Court Iowa Faces Revenue Losses, PUBLIC FiN./WASH.
WATCH, June 29, 1992, at 5 (indicating that the Nordlinger decision does little except certify that
Proposition 13 is not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that it will continue to be the
law).
266. See supra notes 214-263 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in the Nordlinger
decision).
267. Kershner, supra note 214, at A8; see supra notes 14-28 (discussing the impetus for
Proposition 13 as sky rocketing property taxation); Supreme Court Affirmation of Prop.. 13 Seen
Likely to Buoy Like Efforts in Other States, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcs., June 19, 1992, at 1 (indicating
that taxpayer groups in other states are likely to attempt similar initiatives).
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rapid turnover of property.268 However, the United States
Supreme Court did leave several constitutional questions open in
the Nordlinger decision.269
First, the United States Supreme Court refused to hear
Stephanie Nordlinger's claim that her constitutional right to travel
had been violated due to a lack of standing. 270  Thus, an
individual moving to California from another jurisdiction may be
able to attack the constitutionality of Proposition 13 on a right to
travel claim.271 The Court generally gives great deference to state
voters to establish systems of property taxation. 272 However, the
Court may invoke "strict scrutiny" when reviewing a regulation
that restricts the right to travel because the right to interstate travel
has been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right.273 If
the Court applies the strict scrutiny standard in the property
taxation context, California must then show that there is a
compelling governmental interest being served by Proposition
13.274 Both the Amador and Nordlinger decisions indicated bases
for a "welcome stranger" system, but the courts did not evaluate
those interests under strict scrutiny analysis.275 However, state
laws which have a significant impact on interstate migration may
be upheld if they serve reasonable state interests unrelated to
deterring migration and do not arbitrarily award benefits to long
268. See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text (discussing the rational bases for
Proposition 13 cited in Nordlinger); supra notes 117-154 and accompanying text (discussing the
rational bases for Proposition 13 cited in Amador).
269. Taxation, Budget and Accounting, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcs., June 19, 1992, at 1. Phillip
Tatarowicz of Ernst & Young, Chicago, Illinois, indicated that the battle over the constitutional
validity of Proposition 13 is not over yet. Id.
270. See supra notes 239-243 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal to hear the claim
by Stephanie Nordlinger of a violation of her constitutional right to travel because she had not moved
into the state).
271. Taxation, Budget and Accounting, supra note 269, at 1.
272. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that states are given great
deference in establishing systems of property taxation).
273. NOWAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 93, § 14.38, at 873; see supra note 138 (discussing right
to travel challenges and the standard of review used by the court).
274. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 93, § 14.38, at 873.
275. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (indicating the rational bases cited in the
Amador decision); supra notes 229-232 and accompanying text) (indicating the rational bases cited
in the Nordlinger decision).
1804
1993 /Solving The Proposition 13 Puzzle
time residents.276 In addition, California's "welcome stranger"
system does not bear any of the characteristics of state laws which
have been held to interfere with the right to travel. 7 These
characteristics include: Distinctions between newcomer and long-
term residents turning solely on length or timing of residency, or
denying newcomers the basic necessities of life or citizenship.27
Since Proposition 13 imposes a tax burden which does not
categorize out-of-state residents differently from in-state residents,
the Court will unlikely to be able to find any discriminatory
distinction drawn by Proposition 13.279 Thus, it appears unlikely
that Proposition 13 will be held unconstitutional on the ground that
it unduly burdens the right to travel.
Second, the United States Supreme Court has not heard a
challenge to Proposition 13 based on a violation of the dormant
commerce clause.21' There have been claims made on such
grounds in the arena of property taxation.281  The Court has
adopted a four-part test for analyzing the constitutionality of such
28statutes. 82 A state or local tax will be upheld if it is applied to
activity having a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
276. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 93, § 14.38, at 883.
277. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (indicating characteristics which
would interfere with the right to travel); Respondent's Brief at 28, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct.
2326 (1992) (No. 90-1912) (arguing that Proposition 13 contains none of the characteristics which
would interfere with the right to travel).
278. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 72 (1982) (indicating a characteristic of a state
law which would interfere with the right to travel); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 269 (1974) (discussing the characteristics of state laws which interfere with the right to travel).
279. Resporident's Brief at 28, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (No. 90-1912).
280. Taxation, Budget andAccounting, supra note 269, at 1.The Supreme Court has overturned
taxation systems, other than real property systems of taxation, based on Commerce Clause challenges.
See generally Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r, 481 U.S. 454 (1987), Union
Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919), Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247
U.S. 132 (1918), Michigan Central R.R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245 (1906), South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185 (1897)
(reviewing challenges to state taxation systems based on claims of violation of Interstate Commerce
Clause).
281. Taxation, Budget and Accounting, supra note 269, at 1. No such claims have been
successful. Id.
282. Glennon, supra note 4, at 277.
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is fairly related to the services provided by the State.283 If the test
were applied to Proposition 13, it would appear to be
constitutional.284 Property taxation under Proposition 13 does
have a substantial nexus to activity within the state, and taxation is
fairly apportioned based on acquisition value. Proposition 13
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and there is a
fair relation between taxation and services provided by the
State.286 Additionally, as stated above, the Court will give great
deference to the people of California's approval of such a taxation
system.287 Thus, it seems unlikely that a dormant commerce
clause challenge will be successful.288
The final resolution of Proposition 13 may not arise until these
claims are fully litigated.289 However, given the United States
Supreme Court's review of similar challenges, the Court is likely
to uphold Proposition 13 and similar systems of property taxation.
Based on the cases above and the slim probability of success of
future challenges, the judicial system is unlikely to tamper with
Proposition 13. Therefore, any changes to the system must come
from California's voters.
B. The Future of Proposition 13
The inequity in California's property taxation system is
alarming.2 An example of the disparity caused by Proposition
283. Id.; see Nowmc, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTrrTTONAL LAw 288-89 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing the four-part test used to review dormant commerce clause challenges to state taxation
systems).
284. Glennon, supra note 4, at 277.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that states are given great
deference in establishing systems of property taxation).
288. Glennon, supra note 4, at 277.
289. But see supra note 86 (indicating that property taxation systems easily meet the
requirements of the Commerce Clause).
290. See Thomas M. Goetzl, Equity and Inequality: Judging Prop. 13, THE RECoRDER, Feb.
19, 1992, at 8 (stating that there are increasing signs of the public's discontent with Proposition 13);
William Fulton, Is the Party Ending for Slow Growth, SACRwMENTO BEF, Oct. 11, 1992, at Fl
(indicating that after 14 years California is finally experiencing the full consequences of Proposition
13). But see Dan Walters, Tax Revolt Stays on Track, L.A. DAiY J., Oct. 17, 1991, at 6 (stating that
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13 is illustrated by the fact that a 10,000 square foot Bel-Air estate
which sits on 1.6 acres has a smaller property tax burden than a
modest 2,100 square foot home in West Los Angeles.
291
Additionally, a 17,040 square foot ocean-view estate in Palos
Verdes has a smaller tax assessment than a 1,695 Venice
home.292 What can California do to reform a property taxation
system which creates such inequality and contributes to the demise
of local government?
293
1. Abolition of Property Taxes
One alternative would be the complete abolition of property
taxes in California. 94 This would require the repeal of article
XIHA.295 If property taxes were repealed in California, the loss
of revenue, approximately $19 billion in fiscal 1992-93,296 would
have to be replaced by an increase in income taxes or sales
taxes.297  This would solve any inequities in the valuation of
property taxes within the current system.298 However, there is a
strong perception that income and sales taxes are sufficiently high
and any additional taxation, even if property tax was eliminated, is
the real problem is not a battle over the flow of revenue but between social and political realities).
291. Petitioner's Brief at Appendix 1, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (No. 90-
1912). The Bel-Air estate has a market value of $9,000,000, an assessed value of $785,006, and pays
$7,850 annually in property taxes. Id. The West Los Angeles home has a market value of $875,000,
an assessed value of $885,500 and pays $8,850 annually in property taxes. Id.
292. Id. The Palos Verde estate has a market value of $1,400,000, an assessed value of
$169,897, and an annual property tax bill of $1,700. Id. The Venice home has a market value of
$214,000, an assessed value of $214,000, and pays $2,140 annually in property taxes. Id.; see also
David G. Savage, High Court's Hearing Poses Prop. 13's Stiffest Challenge, L.A. TIwo, Feb. 24,
1992, at Al (discussing these examples of inequity under Proposition 13).
293. See SEARs & CrrNn, supra note 28, at 73-95 (discussing tax revolt in California). Any
substantive change to the property tax system under Proposition 13 would require a constitutional
amendment to the California Constitution. Id. If the voters of California become enraged with the
current system, as they were in 1978, support for major reform will be evident. Id.
294. ASSEMBLY BRIEnqr, Boo, supra note 190, at 2; Thomas D. Elias, Sizing Up Substitutes
for Proposition 13, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 27, 1991, at 6.
295. See CA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (providing for the process for amendment of the
California Constitution).
296. ASSEBY BLEm a BooK, supra note 190, at 20.
297. Id.
298. See GoLDBERG, supra note 10, at 66 (indicating that the biggest complaint with the current
system is the inherent inequities).
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unlikely to be viewed favorably."' Thus, this does not appear to
be a viable option for California's property taxpayers.
2. Split the Property Tax Burden Between Residential and
Business Property
One proposal which has been discussed is to have a split
property tax roll, with business property taxed at a higher rate than
residential property.3" There has been much criticism of this
system of taxation, however.3 'O Many state leaders, including
Governor Wilson, believe that such a system of taxation would
stifle business within the state at a time when California is already
struggling to attract and maintain business development. 2 Others
see this as a key vehicle to provide for the additional revenues to
California's local governments.3 3 Many argue that limitations on
residential property taxation are proper because homeowner income
rarely rises in relation to the rise in market value."' However,
reassessment of commercial property to market value reflects the
income-producing potential to the owners of the property.0 5
Should California attempt to adopt such a system, the resulting
299. But see id at 104-105 (indicating that in the 1991 legislative session California enacted
$7.5 billion worth of new taxes).
300. ASSEMBLY BREFNG BOOK, supra note 190, at 32; GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 77. But
see Elias, supra note 292, at 6 (indicating that Governor Pete Wilson said that he would never
support a higher tax on business since he believes that it is already too expensive to do business in
California).
301. Elias, supra note 292, at 6.
302. Id.; see Louise Kehoe, Backlash in the Golden State- After Years of Leading the Green
Movemen4 California has had Enough, FIN. TMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at 15 (discussing the fact that
environmental regulations are forcing businesses out of state and are discouraging new entries to the
state).
303. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 77. It has been argued that Proposition 13 creates an unequal
playing field in the area of corporate or business taxation. Michael S. Strimling, How Prop. 13
Distorts the Economy, L.A. DAILY J., June 17, 1991, at 6. Proposition 13 provides pre-1978 business
with a level of property taxes which is comparatively lower than businesses which have purchased
property since that date. Id. Thus, new, small businesses are at a great disadvantage. Id. Proposition
13 provides a windfall for some and causes bankruptcy for others. Id.
304. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 78.
305. Id. Business property taxes directly reflect the income to be made from the property. Id.
As economic conditions worsen, values go down; as economic conditions rise, so do property values.
Id.
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political battle will be tremendous."° By increasing the business
tax burden, California would discourage companies from coming
to California and encourage companies to leave the state. This loss
of tax revenue may prevent any real tax revenue gained, thereby
working against such an initiative.
3. Establish a Significant Transfer Tax
Some have proposed establishing a significant transfer tax when
real property is sold.307 Transfer taxation is a much different
mechanism than ad valorem property taxation.308 The basis for
the tax would be the difference between the assessed value of the
property before and after the sale.3°
This system is beneficial, some argue, because taxes from long-
term homeowners who have benefited from low property taxes can
be recaptured upon sale. However, under this type of a system
it is likely that the buyer would bear the burden of the cost, since
the price of the home would reflect the transfer tax.3 ' For
example, when these long-term homeowners sell their homes, the
price will be increased to reflect the new transfer tax and the buyer
will bear the tax burden in a higher sales price. Thus, the tax
burden is back on the new property owner where it exists under
Proposition 13. Thus, it seems unlikely that California would
pursue this scheme before others because of continued inequity
within this alternative.
306. See CALIFORNIA BALLOTPAMPtHLET58-63 (Nov. 3,1992) (indicating that Proposition 167
proposed, among other things, a change in corporate property taxes which would have required
reassessment of business when fifty percent or more of an interest in a business was sold and would
presume that this happened every three years). On the November 1992 ballot, California rejected
Proposition 167, 58.1 percent to 41.9 percent. State Developments, DAILY REP. FOR EXECs., Nov. 6,
1992, at 216. Proposition 167 combined many different tax proposals, including raising bank and
corporate taxes, insurance taxes, and the oil severance tax, which caused some to believe that the
timing of the initiative was not proper during a recession. Election Recommendations, L.A. TIMEs,
Nov. 3, 1992, at B6.
307. ASsaMBLY BRIEFINo BooK, supra note 190, at 20; GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 88.
308. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 89.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 90.
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4. Market Value System of Property Taxation
Conceivably the most discussed alternative would be a return
to a market value system of ad valorem property taxation.1 2
Many argue that a market value system of property taxation more
closely approximates a homeowner's ability to pay since the market
price of property often approximates income level.313 Thus, there
is an inherent equity within a market value system of property
taxation since those who can afford to pay higher property taxes
are faced with higher tax rates.
Prior to the decision in Nordlinger, a California State Senate
Commission studied the problems created by Proposition 13314
The Commission's major recommendation was the implementation
of a market value system of property taxation.31 5  The
Commission recommended that the market value system be phased
in over time, as well as a split roll for income-producing property
and residential homeowners.3 6
One criticism with such a system is that it would permit
restoration of rapidly increasing property taxes, like those which
occurred in the 1970's and led to the enactment of Proposition 13
in the first place.317 To protect homeowners from such rapid
increases in property taxation, the Commission recommended that
312. AsSEMBLY BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 190, at 20; CoMMissIoN, supra note 1, at 2; Elias,
supra note 292, at 6; GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 83; Hallye Jordan, Panel Offers Alterations to
Proposition 13, L.A. DAILY J., June 14, 1991, at 6; Martin Smith, IfProp. 13 is Toppled, L.A. DAILY
J., Nov. 13, 1991, at 6; Dan Weikel, What Happens if Proposition 13 is Overturned, L.A. TIMES,
June 7, 1992, at Al. See generally MIcHAEL M. BERNARD, CONSTITUTIONS, TAXATION, AND LAND
POLICY, VOLUMES I & II (1980) (providing a discussion of each of the property taxation provisions
in each of the state constitutions and discussing each of the various taxation systems including market
value).
313. COMMIssION, supra note 1, at 2. There are numerous methods of taxation under a market
value system, including: Annual reassessment, periodic reassessment, assessment by class of property,
and assessment by type of property. MICHAEL M. BERNARD, CONSTITUTIONS, TAXATION AND LAND
PoLicY: VOLUMES I & 11, at 71 (1980).
314. See Cal. S. Res. 42 (1990); Cal. S. Res. 8 (1990) (establishing the Senate Commission on
Property Tax Equity and Revenue and it duties to study the equality of property taxation in
California).
315. CoMMISSION, supra note 1, at 2.
316. Id. at 4.
317. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text (discussing the impetus for Proposition 13).
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a cap be placed on assessment increases.3 18 The cap would
operate in such a way that homeowner taxes would rise
gradually.319 While reassessment to market value or periodic
reassessment to market value may allow for inflation to affect the
levels of property taxation in California, it is the surest way to
establish equity in California property taxation.
5. Increased Homeowner's Exemption
Another possible alternative would be to increase homeowners
exemption from its current $7,000 of assessed value level to a more
substantial figure.32  Enacted in 1972, the homeowner's
exemption was intended to provide some tax relief for lower
income homes.321 Several proposals have been considered by the
California State Legislature.322 One proposal was to change the
exemption to a flat 25 percent of value for homes purchased after
1975.323 Another proposal was to index the exemption for
inflation back to 1978.324
The most effective way for this alternative to work would be
for first-time moderate income home buyer to have the benefits of
an exemption." The exemption could be staggered such that
lower to median homes have a higher percentage of exemption,
while homes in higher price ranges would receive an exemption at
a flat percentage rate.326  This progressive homeowner's
exemption would provide equity within the existing system, but is
not a viable source of additional revenue for local government.327
318. CoMMissioN, supra note 1, at 2.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 6; GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 87.
321. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 87.
322. Id
323. Id.
324. Id
325. CoMMissION, supra note 1, at 7.
326. Id
327. Id
1811
Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 24
Thus, an attempt at homeowner's exemption reform is not the sole
answer.
328
6. Abolishing the Parent to Child Exemption
An additional proposal which has been considered is abolishing
the inheritance of property by a child exemption in Proposition 13.
Section 2 of article XIIIA provides for an exemption from
reappraisal residential property which is transferred to a child.129
It has been argued that the purpose for such an exemption is that
it furthers the continued stability of neighborhoods.3 However,
this merely perpetuates the inequity inherent in Proposition 13
because this exemption may be used for generations .3 1 While
there may have been many transfers between family members
throughout a long period of time, the assessment would still be at
its 1975-76 assessed value.3 2  The Commission included a
recommendation that the parent to child exemption be
abolished.333 It argued that the current policy offends the notion
of equal taxation and that it favors the children with homeowner
parents over non-homeowner parents.334
The abolition of the parent to child exemption would provide
an additional revenue source for California.335  However,
homeowners would likely oppose such a movement based on the
rationales of Proposition 13 cited by several courts noted
above.336 The parent to child exemption allows for preservation
of neighborhoods since parents under the exemption are allowed to
pass their residence on to their children without increasing the
328. Id. at 9.
329. CAL. CoNsT art XIIIA § 2(h).
330. See COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 9. (indicating that the inequity under the homeowner's
exemption is clear). But see Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (1992) (indicating that the
parent-child exemption in article XIIIA is constitutional).
331. COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 10.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 88.
336. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales courts have cited for
Proposition 13).
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assessed value of the property. Despite the opposition, this is an
alternative which deserves serious consideration.
Z Changing the Vote Requirement for Local Property
Measures
Many have argued to change the vote requirement for local
property tax increases from two-thirds to a majority vote." 7
Proposition 13 allows for the "tyranny of the minority" by
requiring two-thirds vote for an increase in property taxes.338 The
United States of America was founded on a belief in a system of
majority rule, and requiring a two-thirds vote runs contrary to this
belief by allowing one-third of an electorate to control the
outcome.
339
However, others have argued that the requirement of a two-
thirds vote protects local citizens from the majority party
controlling the passage huge tax increases. 340 The Commission,
however, has recommended that the two-thirds vote requirement be
removed from article XIIIA?' In making this recommendation,
the Commission noted that while there may be a perception that a
two-third vote requirement protects against excessive taxation, it is
antithesis of majority rule government.342
A possible solution to the competing concerns articulated by the
Commission may be to require a double majority.343 A double
majority vote requires majority approval of local voters as well as
majority approval of the California State Legislature to raise local
taxes.34 Such a requirement would provide for local control of
tax increases, as well as provide for a level of safeguards against
337. ASSEMBLY BRIEING BOoK, supra note 190, at 31-32; CoMMIsSIoN, supra note 1 at 10;
GOLDBmO, supra note 10, at 97.
338. Editorial (from San Diego Union-Tribune), On Prop. 13..Tyranny of a Minority, L.A.
DAILY J., June 29, 1992, at 6.
339. COMMiSSION, supra note 1, at 10.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 96.
344. 1l
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excessive increases of taxation.345 California should immediately
implement this double majority requirement.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the inequities caused by Proposition 13 continue to grow, so
too will discontent among the citizens of California. Based on the
continued judicial trend of upholding the constitutionality of
Proposition 13, remedies to these injustices are likely to go
unresolved through the judicial process. Therefore, it will be the
voters of California who will determine the fate of Proposition 13.
While there are no easy answers to this puzzle, there must be a
realization that severe inequity has arrived. Proposition 13's
limitation on excessive property taxation has served its purpose.
Every Californian, from the owner of a Beverly Hills mansion to
the owners of a tiny home in Watts, is now affected by the
disparities caused by the "welcome stranger" system of property
taxation. Now is the time for California to return to a market value
system of property taxation. However, this time California can
benefit from the lessons learned from Proposition 13 and place a
cap on property taxation increases. Once this is accomplished,
equity will return and possibly local governments can begin to
provide adequate services to their constituents.
Steven T. Lawrence
345. Id
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